In modern conflict, the most important battlefield may no longer be territory, infrastructure, or even networks; it is truth itself.  Cyberspace has expanded the battlefield beyond geography into the information ecosystems that shape public perception and political will.

Four years ago, misinformation and disinformation campaigns that accompanied the "special military operation" in Ukraine were considered trademark Russian tradecraft.  Today, nearly every major government is in on the action (some more so than others.)  Amplified by artificial intelligence, state actors blend falsehoods and fabrications beamed into your living room with technical attacks against telecommunications and government networks coordinating disinformation designed to shape decisions far from the battlefield.

Are cyber weapons primarily tools of disruption, or instruments of strategic signaling?  Have we entered an era where influence operations are more decisive than technical exploits?  And if cyber war increasingly targets perception rather than infrastructure, how should the security community adapt its defenses?  The session will explore these questions.

Attendees will leave with a framework for understanding how modern cyber conflict blends technical attacks, strategic signaling, and influence operations, and what that means for defending organizations when the battlefield increasingly includes perception itself.

I'm working on the slides to get them into InfoSec World format; should have those to you in advance of the event.